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IN 'l~HE SUPREME COURT
()1~~

THE

STATE OF UTAH
ST.\'l'E OF l.~·r.\H,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.\:\.\S'f.\(~10 GALLEGOS, aka
'rED c;.\LLEGOS, and
Jlr~\~ R:\LLES GALLEGOS, aka
R. \ \p GALLEGOS,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 10109

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ST.\TE~IENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

The appellants \\·ere jointly tried for the crime of murder
in the first degree, and convicted upon jury trial of murder
in thr second degree, from which convictions they have
jointly appealed.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellants \\·ere jointly charged by information with
the crime of murder in the first degree in violation of
76-30-1&3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Upon jury trial
in the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Ray VanCott,
Jr.. judge, the appellants were found guilty of murder in
the second degree and committed to the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOlTGHT

0~

APPEAL

The respondent submits the judgment should be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts
as being more directly in accord with what was presented
below.
On 4 November 1961, Robert Fernandez was knifed by
a person he could recognize, but whose name he did not
know (R. 164, 167). He was hospitalized for two months
from the knife wounds. The appellant, Ted Gallegos had
knifed Fernandez (R. 167). Fernandez periodically had
looked for the person who knifed him and around 4 August
1963, he saw Ted Gallegos in Liberty Park (R. 168). Fernandez had learned Gallegos' identity sometime before.
On 4 August 1963, a Sunday, Raul Yanes, Max James and
Dave Albo were in the company of Fernandez when he saw
Ted Gallegos ( R. 168) . Upon seeing Gallegos, Femandez
and some of his companions went to Fernandez's home and
got some baseball bats (R. 169). They returned to Liberty
Park where Fernandez encountered Gallegos and asked if
he were "Albert Martinez" ( R. 170). Gallegos said he was
not and told Fernandez who he was, whereupon Fernandez
struck Gallegos several times in the head with the bat,
knocking him to the ground and rendering him unconscious ( R. 171 ) . David Albo struck Bob Rivenburgh who
was standing with Gallegos ( R. 190, 222). Raul Yanes was
standing behind Fernandez and after Gallegos was knocked
down, Yanes may have kicked him (R. 223). Fernandez
and the others left and Gallegos was taken to the Salt Lake
County Hospital where Dr. Gary Morrison gave him treatment for his injuries (R. 304).
Subsequent to Ted Gallegos' release from the hospital,
the Salt Lake Police were contacted; however, Ted and
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Ra v. Gallegos
and others started to look for the assailant
'
(R. 316).
On 10 October 1963, David Albo was in the El Prado
Tavern in Salt Lake. Ray Gallegos, Ted Gallegos and
Richard Jerome were all present (R. 191, 229). Jerome
approached Albo and told him it was a lousy thing that had
been done to Ted Gallegos and said that they were going to
get him (R. 191). Thereupon, someone held Albo's arms
behind him and Ray Gallegos hit him in the head with a
bottle or a glass causing his head to bleed (R. 192, 237).
Upon being hit, Albo ran out the door and down to the
Hideout Bar (R. 192). He was followed by the appellants
and Jerome (R. 233-236) and was threatened that they
\vere going to get all of the park attackers ( R. 193, 241 ) .
Albo remained in the Hideout. The bartender put down
the disturbance and Albo left with some other friends.
Prior to this incident, the Gallegos brothers knew that
one of the park assailants was a little man. Raul Yanes was
only 4'9Y2" and weighed about 100 pounds (R. 155). On
A.ugust 10, 1963, Yanes was seen at the Annex Bar around
10: 00-10: 30 p.m. Around midnight, Mike Hoopiiana, an
ex-convict on parole ( R. 25 7), saw Raul Yanes at the
Cro\rs Nest Tavern on 4th South and State Streets (R.
258). He gave Yanes a ride in his automobile to the Annex
Bar at 7th South and State Streets ( R. 259) . Hoopiiana
parked his car in a parking lot adjacent to a building on
the northwest comer of 7th South and State Streets (R.
259-261 ) . Yanes and Hoopiiana started to walk to the
Annex when Hoopiiana heard a "few people" running
to,,·ards him from behind (R. 260-261). Someone pushed
Hoopiiana up against the building on the comer and told
him to "stay out of it or you will get hurt" ( R. 261 ) . The
person had a knife and was identified as Ray Gallegos.
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Raul Yanes was knocked down by Ted Gallegos who then
reached down and knifed Yanes in the heart ( R. 262). Ray
Gallegos made a pass at Yanes as he fell ( R. 263). Thereafter, the Gallegoses and others ran off through the parking
lot. Mike Hoopiiana then walked into the Annex Bar,
stayed for a moment, and then left. Several persons observed some people running from the deceased as he fell
(R.250,253,254,255).
Shortly after midnight, Keith Larsen left the Annex Bar
(R. 245). He passed two persons as he went to his car. As
he started backing his automobile, he heard footsteps and
looked over and saw a man lying on the ground bleeding
badly ( R. 246-248) . The area where the killing occurred
was well lighted ( R. 136, 137, 139, 24 7).
Subsequently, Hoopiiana contacted his attorney, Norm
Wade, and identified the appellants as the killers (R. 290).
Wade was concerned in case Hoopiiana may have been
seen at the scene and could be charged ( R. 277). Wade,
therefore, contacted the County Attorney's office (R. 266)
and Hoopiiana gave the police a statement. The statement
(Exhibit 18) was read into the record, curiously enough at
defense counsel's request. The statement given to the police
on 13 August, 1963 ( R. 283) recited:
"Well, I went to a reunion at my mother's house, and
I got there about 7:OOPM. We was having a kind of
get together or party, on Saturday, the lOth, and we
stayed there until about 11: OOPM. I don't know the
name of this bar, but it's on 33rd South. We stayed
there about 45 minutes. My sister became ill, and so
I drove her home. I got her home at 12: 00 Midnight.
I left her house, and was driving home along State
Street, when I seen Raul Yanes, walking between 4th
and 5th South. Which was about 10 minutes after
12: 00 Midnight. I stopped and asked him where he
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'vas going, and he said to the Annex Bar. So I.drove
hirn down there. We parked the car in the parkmg lot
that faces 7th South, and it was about between 10 and
15 minutes after. We got out of my car, and walked
to the parking lot to State Street.
"\ Ve reached the street and all at once I heard running feet. I turned around, and there were four men
"·ith knivrs. The tallest of the four put the knife on me
and said that if I moved he would cut my head off. I
backed against the building and asked him what his
beef \vas. Then at this time, I looked at Raul and this
other man which I recognized as Ted Gallegos, said
in an angry voice, "Hello Raul." And smacked him
and then pushed him against the building and pulled
him around the corner. And I seen his hand with the
knife slashing horizontally at Raul's stomach. Then
Raul fell down onto State Street. And as he was falling, the man who had the knife on me whom I recognized as Ray Gallegos, reached over and stabbed Raul
in the back. As Raul was laying on the ground, Ted
Gallegos reached down and stuck the knife in the left
side of Raul's chest, two or three times. After I had
seen this, I began inching my way along the building
towards the door of the Annex Bar. The men seemed
to be puzzled as to what to do. I got about ten feet
away, inching along the building, and then I turned
and walked to the door of the Annex and went inside.
I stayed inside about two minutes, long enough to get
my mind straight as to what had happened. Then I
\valked back out the front door and walked past Raul's
body. Raul was laying on his back with his arms bent
and his forearms in the air. At this time, I was positive
?e ,,·as dead. I walked through the parking lot, got
mto my car, and then went home."
Raul \y anes died of the stab wound in the heart ( R. 160).
The autopsy disclosed three wounds: one to the heart, one
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in the left side, and one cutting wound across the upper
stomach ( R. 154 ) .
The appellants did not testify, and the jury returned a
verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. Other
pertinent facts will be discussed as they relate to the points
urged on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THAT MANSLAUGHTER REQUIRED AN INTENT TO KILL SINCE
A. THE JURY RETURNED A VERDICT OF SECOND
DEGREE MURDER AND THE ERROR ON THE
LESSER OFFENSE COULD NOT HAVE PREJUDICED.
B. THE EVIDENCE DID NOT WARRANT AN INSTRUCTION ON MANSLAUGHTER.

The appellants in Point I of their brief challenge Instruction No. 11 ( R. 346) given by the court on the crime of
voluntary manslaughter. In State v. CoboJ 90 U.2d 89, 60
P.2d 952 ( 1936), this court ruled that one of the essential
elements to the crime of voluntary manslaughter was that
the killing be willful or intentional or that the infliction of
great bodily harm be done willfully and intentionally. The
C obo case is somewhat inconsistent to the extent that at
one point a disjunctive "or" is used and another point, conjunctive "and" is used when the elements discussed do not
warrant the difference. Respondent admits that the trial
court erred in Instruction No. 11 by failing to instruct that
the killing must have been intentional or willful if the appellants were to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
However, the respondent submits that the appellants were
not prejudiced by the instruction that was given since (a)
the appellants were convicted of murder in the second degree, which is a higher offense, and the jury must have necessarily found each of the elements required for the convicSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion of the crime of second degree; and (b) that the trial
rourt errrd in giving the instn1ction on voluntary manslaugh tcr in the first instance since the evidence before the
court could in no \vay justify the submission of the lesser
offl'nsc of voluntary manslaughter to the jury.
.\. It is \\Tll settled that an erroneous instruction on a
lesser offense of the charge of homicide cannot be claimed
as error on appeal where an accused is convicted of a
greater charge. 26 Am. Jur., Homicide, Section 556, it is
stated:
"Generally speaking, an accused cannot successfully
complain of error in instructions which are favorable
to himself. Consequently, one who has been convicted
of a superior grade of culpable homicide is not to be
deemed prejudiced by and cannot attack an erroneous
charge in respect of a lower grade of homicide."
In 41 C.J .S., Homicide, Section 4 27 c ( 2), it is stated:
"Ordinarily error in instructions relating to a lower
degree of homicide or assault than that of which accused is convicted is held to be harmless, and whether
or not it is prejudicial is controlled by the facts and the
nature of the error. Such error generally is harmless
\vhere the erroneous instruction relates to manslaughter and accused is convicted of murder or murder in
the first or second degree, or where the instruction relates to involuntary manslaughter and accused is convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Where accused is
convicted of murder in the first degree, the giving of
erroneous instructions on a lower degree of homicide
is not prejudicial to accused where the evidence is
ample to support the verdict rendered, and where the
instructions complained of could not have misled or
confused the jury or have had any effect on their verdict, or \\"here the instruction is more favorable to
accused than it should have been."
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In People v. CoxJ 341 Ill. 111, 172 N.E. 64 ( 1930), the
accused was convicted of the crime of murder. On appeal,
it was contended that two instructions given to the jury on
involuntary manslaughter on the request of the prosecution
were erroneous. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in rejecting the contention, stated:
"The plaintiff in error was found guilty of the major
crime, and obviously he was not prejudiced by the instruction defining manslaughter."
In King v. The Commonwealth) 224 Ky. 822, 7 S.W.2d
228 ( 1928), the accused was convicted of murder. It was
contended on appeal that the trial court erred in defining
involuntary manslaughter. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
ruled that the appellant could claim no prejudice stating:
"Instruction No.3, defining involuntary manslaughter is criticized, but the instruction is not susceptible
of the interpretation placed thereon by counsel for
appellant; but, even if it were, it was not prejudicial,
since he was convicted of murder under an instruction
concededly proper."
In State v. NoelJ 133 A. 274 (N.J. 1926), the appellant
was convicted of murder in the first degree. He contended
that the trial court erred in instruction given on murder in
the second degree. TheNew Jersey court agreed, but found
that he could claim no prejudice, stating:
''It is next insisted that the charge of the court was
erroneous with respect to the definition of murder in
the second degree. Admitting this to be so, it was not
prejudicial to the defendant. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Murder in the first
degree was properly defined in the charge. It therefore
was immaterial 'vhether murder in the second degree
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\vas properly defined. The same question has arisen in
two recent cases in this court where the definition of
rnurdcr in the second degree was the same as that given
by the court, in the present case. These are the cases
of State v. Mosley, 131 A. 292 (not yet officially reported), and the case of State v. Martin, 132 A. 93
(not yet officially reported) . In these cases this court
held that no harm had been done to the defendant by
incorrectly defining murder in the second degree."
In State v. Zupkosky, 127 N.J.L. 218, 21 A.2d 771
( 1941 ) , the appellant was convicted of murder in the first
degree. Again the allegation was made that the trial court
erred in its charge of murder in the second degree. The
court ruled that no prejudice could arise from such an instruction. It stated:
"It is further contended that the court erroneously
charged the jury upon the subject of second degree
murder. The defendant, as we have already said, was
convicted of murder in the first degree without recommendation, upon a charge with regard to the elements
of that offense which we have found correct in the
only respects questioned. The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree, upon evidence
that. without undertaking to review, we consider fully
supports that finding. Further, the verdict, as we formally decide in the next paragraph, was not against
the weight of evidence. Therefore, the judge's definition of murder in the second degree need not be examined or passed upon because, in the light of the
jury's verdict, it could not have been harmful to the
defendant. State v. Mosley, 102 N.J.L. 94, 131 A. 292,
State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659, 674, 133 A. 274. Even
if we assume that point to be well made the error is not
ground for reversal.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

Recently, in Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 171 A.2d 699
( 1961), the Maryland court was faced with a case where
the appellant was convicted of second degree murder. He
argued that it was err for the trial court not to distinguish
between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in instructions given to the jury. The Maryland court rejected
any claim of prejudicial error stating:
"***Secondly, although it appears that an instruction was given as to voluntary manslaughter (a higher
grade than involuntary manslaughter), the jury found
the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, a
finding which clearly indicates that the jury was convinced that the defendant was guilty of a greater
degree of homicide than manslaughter of either grade.
* * *"
In State v. Vanell, 106 P. 364 (Mont. 1910), the appellant, like the appellants in the instant case, was found guilty
of murder in the second degree and claimed that the trial
court has erred in instructing on manslaughter. The Montana court rejected a claim that the appellant could take
advantage of the claimed error stating:
"* * * Even so, the defendant cannot complain. He
was found guilty of murder in the second degree, and
these instructions upon the subject of manslaughter
merely gave the jury an opportunity to find him guilty
of a lesser offense. State v. Farnham, 35 Mont. 375,
89 Pac. 728."
In United States v. Ransom, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 195, 15
C.M.R. 195 ( 1954), the accused was charged with the
crimes of murder and rape. He was convicted of the crime
of premeditated murder and on appeal claimed that the
trial court had erred in its instructions on unpremeditated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
murdrr. The court, relying in part upon the authorities
abo\T quoted, stated:
\\Inasmuch as the instructions on premediated murdt:r ''Tre correct and the court found the accused
guilty of that offense, he could not have been harmed
by an incorrect instruction on the lesser included
offense.''
Similarly, in United States v. Henderson, 29 C.M.R. 717
( 1960) , the accused alleged that the trial court had given
an erroneous instruction on intent as it related to the offense
of unpremeditated murder. The trial court had found the
appellant guilty of murder in the first degree. Relying upon
the Ransom case, above mentioned, it was held that no
prejudicial error could be claimed. See also Kemp v. Canal
Zone, 167 F.2d 938 (1948); Blalack v. State, 60 S.W.2d
231 (Tex. Crim. 1933).
Although the issue was not clearly considered, in State
v. Alatteri, 119 U. 143, 225 P.2d 325 ( 1951), the court
ruled that an erroneous instruction as to murder in the
second degree could not be claimed as error under the circumstances. The opinion seems to imply clearly that the
con\·iction on the charge of first degree under the facts presented vitiated any claim for prejudice.
The appellants in the instant case are in no position to
claim error because of the erroneous instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The jury was carefully and correctly
instructed on murder in the second degree and murder in
the first degree. In order to convict of murder in the second
degree, it \vas necessary for the jury to find an intent to
inflict great bodily harm. The elements necessary for the
conviction of murder in the second degree necessarily enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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compassed the elements in voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, the appellants cannot claim prejudice.
B. It is submitted that the error of the trial court in failing to instruct on the element of intent in the offense of voluntary manslaughter cannot be deemed prejudicial error
since the appellants, as a matter of law, were not entitled
to an instruction of voluntary manslaughter. The evidence
discloses that the appellants' defense was based upon a question of identity. No evidence was offered before the court
that the killing took place during a quarrel or in the sudden
heat of passion. The facts in this case show that the deceased participated in the beating of one of the appellants,
Ted Gallegos, which was a revenge beating for Gallegos
having knifed one of the deceased's friends. The beating
occurred on August 4, 1963. The appellant, Ted Gallegos,
was taken to the hospital and treated. Ray Gallegos was
not involved in the fracas. The police were notified and
undertook an investigation. Thereafter, the Gallegos brothers, along with other companions, deliberately sought out
the deceased and Dave Albo in order to get even. At the
time of the killing, the deceased and Mike Hoopiiana were
walking from the latter's automobile to the Annex Bar.
Yanes had said nothing to cause a quarrel, he had done
nothing to provoke the response which occurred on the
morning of the 11th of August, 1963, some seven days after
the beating. He was approached from behind, knocked
down and knifed through the heart. It is submitted that,
on these facts, there "ras no evidence warranting the submission of a charge of voluntary manslaughter.
Section 76-30-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines
voluntary manslaughter as being the killing of a human
being without malice. Section 76-30-5 ( 1 ) adds the following elements:
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"Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
pass .ton. ''

In State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 ( 1963), this
court obseiVccl as to the statutory definition, "This statutory
definition is but declaratory of the common law." The court
\Vas manifestly correct in its conclusion. Clark and Marshall
Crimes, 6th Ed., Section 10.11 ; Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 18th Ed. ( 1962) Section 6. It is well established
that if the circumstances show the killer acts not in the heat
of blood but from malice, that no issue of manslaughter is
raised. Clark and Marshall, supra, pages 620-21 ; 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, chapter 11, paragraph 18. Additionally, in People v. Calton, 5 U. 451, 16 P. 902 ( 1888),
this court upheld an instruction on voluntary manslaughter
\vhich advised the jury that to reduce homicide to manslaughter on the grounds of passion or sudden quarrel, the
provocation must be such that would give rise to an irresistible passion in the mind of a reasonable person. At common
Ia,\·, this provocation arose in four circumstances:
1. Violent assault.
2. Unlawful arrest.
3. A killing in mutual combat, provided no unfair advantages taken.
4. A killing by the husband of the wife's paramour
upon the discovery of adultery.
(Clark and Marshall, supra, page 619) .

In the instant case, the killing occurred in none of these
circumstances. Although there was a previous assault on
Ted Gallegos, the assault occurred seven days previous to
the killing of Yanes. It is well settled that if the killing is
done under circumstances which would show that the
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"blood of the slayer had actually cooled" or that "there was
reasonable time for such cooling," there can be no manslaughter. Clark and Marshall, supra, 619. In the instant
case, the crime was done with malice and was done after
there had been substantial opportunity for a cooling to
occur. Indeed, the police had been notified and their investigation undertaken. Further, the evidence clearly shows
there had been a cooling, so the killing was not done in passion but was done solely out of malice. Ray Gallegos was not
the victim of an assault of any kind; and, therefore, could
hardly claim the right to revenge against his brother's attacker. In Clark and Marshall, supra, page 632, it is noted:
"It is not necessary, however, in all cases, to show
that the blood actually did cool, in order to make out
a case of murder. It is enough to show that there was
a reasonable time for cooling, for the law requires that
men shall act reasonably in controlling their passions.
The reasonable time for cooling is the time within
which an ordinarily reasonable man would cool under
like circumstances. * * *"
The only evidence before the court in this case is such that
no issue of manslaughter was raised.
In State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 ( 1955),
this court considered, among other claims of error, the contention that the trial court erred in failing to instruct as to
lesser included offenses where the defendant was convicted
of second degree murder. The facts and circumstances in
that case are somewhat similar to those in the instant case,
although in that case it was not clear that the killing was
done maliciously and that a reasonable period of cooling off
had elapsed before the killing. This court held that the trial
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court did not err in failing to instruct upon voluntary manslau,ghter. The court observed:

"* * * Aside

from the incredibility of defendant's
testimony as to his movements, whereabouts and other
acti\'ities, 'vith which one is impressed in reading the
record, there is no evidence from which reasonable
persons could conclude that the victim had died from
a simple battery, affray, in a sudden heat of passion or
other,vise than 'vith malice aforethought or as a result
of a murderous intent. Under such circumstances, instructions as to lesser offenses would only confuse.***"
In 41 C.J.S., Homicide, it is stated:
"Where the evidence does not warrant the giving of
any instruction on a certain degree of homicide lower
than that of which accused is found guilty, the giving
of an instruction on that lower degree, whether correct
or incorrect as an abstract statement of law, is not
prejudicial or reversible error. The rule is applicable
'"here the unauthorized instruction relates to murder
in the second degree and accused is convicted of murder in the first degree; or where the instruction relates
to murder in the third degree and accused is convicted
of murder in the second degree; or where the instruction relates to manslaughter and accused is convicted
of murder; or \vhere the instruction relates to involuntary manslaughter and the conviction is of voluntary
manslaughter; or where the instruction relates to aggravated assault and the conviction is of assault with
intent to kill. * * *"
See also Am. Jur., Homicide, Sections 558, 559.
In State v. Matteri, 119 U. 143, 225 P.2d 325 ( 1951),
the appellant \\·as convicted of first degree murder. The
trial court instructed the jury on the crime of second degree
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murder and left out the possibility of the killing occurring
from an intent to kill. The court noted that unless the evidence was such that a jury could reasonably decide in favor
of second degree murder, that it would not be prejudicial
to fail to give the correct instruction. The court found that
the evidence did not reasonably raise the issue of second
degree murder and concluded that the instruction could
not have been prejudicial. The court noted, in part:
"The only evidence bearing upon the killing of the
deceased was that adduced by the State. There was
no evidence direct or indirect of any mitigating circumstances. * * *"
The facts in the instant case are somewhat the same and
under no construction of those facts could reasonable minds
conclude that the appellants had only committed the crime
of voluntary manslaughter. Consequently, in accordance
with the M atteri case, it was not err to give erroneous instruction on a lesser offense. See State v. Condit, 101 U.
558, 125 P.2d 801; State v. Mewhinney, 43 U. 135, 134 P.
632;Statev. Thorne,41 U.414, 126P.286;WarrenHomicide, Vol. 4, page 403.
In summary, it must be concluded that although the trial
court's instruction on involuntary manslaughter was erroneous, the appellants were in no way prejudiced by the error
and as a consequence can claim no basis for reversal.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.1.

The appellants contend the trial court committed error
in refusing to give their requested Instruction No. 1. An
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<·xamination of the requested instruction ( R. 30, 31 ) as
against the instructions given, conclusively demonstrates
that there was no error in refusing the requested instruction. First, paragraph 3 of the requested instruction was
given in fact in several other instructions of the court. Thus,
instructions 1, 8 and 9 (R. 32, 36,41) which the court actually gave to the jury adequately set forth the requirement
that proof to convict be beyond all reasonable doubt and
that the prosecution must sustain the burden from the evidence to prove that guilt.
The fourth paragraph of the requested instruction was
not applicable to the case. The evidence presented by the
prosecution was primarily direct evidence and the prosecution did not rely substantially upon circumstantial evidence.
The facts concerning the motive for the crime, the intent of
the appellants, their activities immediately preceding the
commission of the crime and the actual commission of the
crime \Vere testified to by witnesses who were aware of the
facts by their direct knowledge. Mike Hoopiiana testified
as to the identity of the killers. The appellants argue that
the identity was not as certain as it should have been. This,
ho\vever, is not circumstantial evidence but is merely the
question of the weight to be given to direct evidence. What
the appellants contend as circumstantial evidence is actually a measure of the weight to be accorded the direct testimony of the eye witness to the killing. Since the prosecution
did not rely upon mere circumstantial evidence to prove
the elements of the crime, it cannot be successfully argued
that Instruction No. 1, and especially paragraph 4 thereof
which implies that the prosecution relies totally upon circumstantial evidence, should have been given. Paragraphs
I and 2 of the requested instruction are merely abstract
principles of law unrelated to the facts of the case. In the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
absence of explanation, the instruction is meaningless. In
State v. ThompsonJ 110 U. 113, 170 P.2d 153 ( 1946), this
court admonished against the giving of instructions in the
abstract and stated :
"Defendant urges that the court erred in giving general abstract instructions, using ancient and highly
technical legal terms not understood by Ia ymen, giving
instructions which had no application to the facts in
this case, and in not applying the law to the facts which
were supported by the evidence, and that the jury was
probably misled thereby and the case should be reversed on that account. We have repeatedly criticized
the giving of abstract statements of the law to the jury,
and held that it is the duty of the court to apply the law
to the facts supported by the evidence and to not instruct on any question which is not involved in the case
under the evidence. * * * We think that it cannot be
too strongly emphasized that the court should apply
the law to the facts as they appear from the evidence,
and should instruct only on the law which has a bearing on facts, and in stating the necessary elements to
constitute the crime charged it should submit to the
jury the facts involved in the case and not merely generalizations, and where possible should avoid the use of
technical legal terms and cumbersome definitions
thereof, by using terms which will readily be understood by laymen. In that way, the jury will be given a
much clearer understanding of its problems. Throughout this opinion we have attempted to observe these
rules in our discussion of the legal questions here involved."
A giving of the appellants' requested instruction as it was
submitted to the court would have violated the rule set out
in State v. Thompson. This alone would justify the court
in refusing to give the requested instruction.
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Additionally, since the prosecution did not rely upon circumstantial evidence to any substantial degree to prove its
case, it cannot be successfully argued that it was error to
gi\T the requested instruction. In People v. Downer, 57
Cal. 2d 800, 22 Cal. Rptr. 347, 372 P.2d 107 ( 1962), the
California Supreme Court was faced with a similar condition in an incest case. The court rejected the contention of
the appellant that the evidence relied upon was circumstantial. The argument made by the appellant in that case
bears similarity to that made by the appellants in the instant case. The testimony in both cases is predominantly
\vhat the \vitnesses actually saw or heard and, therefore,
direct evidence and not circumstantial evidence. In rejecting the appellants' contention, the court stated:
"The bulk of the prosecution evidence consisted of
direct testimony of the victim as to the acts of defendant on the night of December 16. Defendant made a
statement when he entered his daughter's bedroom
dressed only in his underwear that he 'wanted some
relief.' This statement showed his intention to have
sexual relations \vith his daughter. The words had a
"·ell-understood meaning for the daughter, because
they '\Vere the same words he had used on a number of
prior occasions \vhen he forced himself upon her. Thus
the jury could conclude, based upon defendant's own
statement, that he had the requisite specific intent to
perpetrate the crime of incest.
"The prosecution did not rest its case wholly, or even
substantially, upon circumstantial evidence, and hence
an instruction on circumstantial evidence was not required. (People v. Williams, 155 Cal.App.2d 328, 331
[5]~ 318 P.2d 106 [hearing denied by Supreme Court];
cf. People v. Ely, 170 Cal.App.2d 301, 302 [2], 338
P.2d 483; People v. Roberts, 167 Cal.App.2d 238, 242
[3], 334 P.2d 164.)"
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The appellants cite no case which would favor reversal
under the circumstances of this case. Indeed, the evidence
as it was offered to the jury was testimony of witnesses as to
what they actually observed. Witnesses testified directly as
to the assault upon Ted Gallegos. They testified directly as
to Gallegos' action immediately subsequent to the assault.
There was testimony as to the actions of Jerome and the
Gallegos brothers indicating that they would get even with
those who had made the assault upon Ted Gallegos. The
testimony of Mike Hoopiiana came in in two forms: first,
the testimony on the stand and second, his statement to the
police officers immediately after the killing. In both instances, his testimony is of facts and circumstances which he
actually observed and heard. In both instances, he identifies the Gallegos brothers as the murderers. Under these
circumstances, it is clear that there was no basis to warrant
giving requested Instruction No.1.
Finally, it must be observed that the court's instructions,
when viewed as a whole, encompassed many of the aspects
of the requested Instruction No. 1. As to each of the crimes
instructed upon, the jury was charged that the appellants'
guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. They were
instructed that they \vere the sole judges of the guilt or
innocence of the appellants and that if they could reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on any reasonable
ground other than guilt, that they should acquit the appellants ( R. 54) . The instruction requested by the appellants,
like their argument in Point 2 of the brief, bears no relationship to what actually occurred at trial. As a consequence, there is no basis for reversal upon the refusal of
appellants' requested Instruction No. 1.
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POINT III
TilE TRI.\L CC)URT DID NOT ERR TO THE PREJUDICE
C>F TII.E APPELLA0!1'S NOR WERE THEY DENIED DUE
PRC1CESS OF LAW.

In Point 3 of the appellants' brief, they contend that
there is collective error on the part of the trial court to such
an extent that they were denied a fair trial and, consequently, due process of law. The appellants have set out
claims of error in Points A through H. The respondent submits that none of the claims of error are in any manner collectively or singularly such as to warrant reversal.
A. The appellants contend that the trial court erred by
gi\'ing oral instructions. An analysis of the record shows
that this is not correct. The trial court prepared written instructions which were given to the jury and which were
served upon counsel (R. 32-54). Subsequent to the reading of the instructions, the trial court explained to the jury
\rhy the alternate juror was being discharged, it presented
the verdicts to the court and advised them as to their liberties of deliberation. He also indicated that he would allow
them to deliberate until 7: 00 p.m. at which time he would
consult \vith them and ascertain their desires so far as dinner \ras concerned. He explained to them how to contact
the bailiff should they desire to go to the lavatory (R. 361362). It is submitted that none of these things in fact constitute instructions on the case. They were not instructions
on the la\v nor on the evidence, nor actually in any way related to "·hat is commonly considered the instructions to the
jury on the Ia"· of the case. At best, they could be considered
as admonitions to the jurors and a statement of some of the
practicalities concerning their deliberations. Even if it could
be assumed that these were oral instructions, the appellants
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may not claim error of any kind on that basis for a variety
of reasons.
First, subsequent to the court's statements, counsel for the
appellants took an exception ( R. 362) . Counsel said he
would withdraw exceptions if the jury would be called back
and advised that a desirable verdict should be rendered to
the defendants as well as the state and that a previous informal request of counsel for the appellants be submitted
to the jurors ( R. 363-364) . Thereafter the jurors were recalled and advised as appellants' counsel had requested
( R. 364) and appellants' counsel expressly stated that he
had nothing further to add concerning the matter. Consequently, an express waiver of any error appears in the
record.
Second, it is submitted that there is no requirement that
the jury be instructed in writing. Section 77-31-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, establishes the order of trial. Subsection 5 of that provision provides: "When the evidence
is concluded, the court must charge the jury as in civil actions." This provision was enacted into law by Section 4845
of the Revised Statutes of 1898. The compiled Laws of
1917, Section 6802, set out the mode of instructing jurors
in civil cases. It provided that the court "shall instruct the
jury in writing upon the law applicable to the case." This
provision was repealed with the promulgation by the court
of the rules of civil procedure. Rule 51 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure was substituted for 104-24-14, Utah
Code Annotated 1943. Contrary to the assertion of the appellants, Rule 51 does not use the same language as the
previous provision. It absolutely does not say that the jurors
shall be instructed in writing. It provides that the court
shall inform counsel of its proposed action on request prior
to instructing the jury and that it shall furnish counsel with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
a copy of its proposed instructions unless the parties stipu-

late that instructions may be given orally. It then provides
that if instructions are to be given in writing, all objections
n1ust be made before the jury is instructed. This court has
ncvr.r ruled as to what Rule 51 requires. It is submitted that
it requires the following:
First, that the court may instruct either orally or in writing. Ho\\Tvcr, if the instructions are to be given in writing,
he need only serve counsel with copies of the instructions
prior to their being given to the jury. If this is completed,
the requirement of Rule 51 is met. Counsel may waive written instruction at \vhich time no instructions need be served
upon counsel. In the instant case, counsel expressly waived
\\Titten instructions if the court would recall the jury and
ad\·ise them, as the court in fact did.
~\dditionally, Rule 51 would not seem to prohibit the
court in giving oral instructions which are not those "on the
la\r. ,,
Finally, it should not be noted that everything the court
in fact did "·as taken down.
In J"anCottv. Wall, 53 U. 282, 178P.42, thiscourtindicated that under the previous provisions of Section 104-2414, Utah Code Annotated 1943, that if the instructions
\vcre incorporated into the record on appeal and if they
appeared to correctly state the law applicable so that no
prejudice results, reversal is not warranted. In State v. FinnC)', 141 Kan. 12,40 P.2d 411 ( 1935), the Kansas Supreme
Court ("·here the trial court gave almost identical instructions to the jury as those given here) held that such instructions do not violate the requirement that instructions be in
,,·riting. Instructions given in the Kansas case were to the
jury as to how they should mark their ballot. See also Anderson l'. The Commonwealth, 205 Ky. 369, 265 S.W. 824. It
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appears that appellants can claim no basis for error on the
form of the court's instructions.
B. Appellants' argument that the trial court's ruling
prejudiced them because it denied them their motion to dismiss where the motion was made under the understanding
that it was made as if it were at the conclusion of the defense's request, is without merit. If the prosecution had presented a prima facie case, then no matter what the defense
presented, the issue would be one for the jury's deliberation.
In the instant case~ the prosecution had established a killing, that the killing was under felonious circumstances, and
that the appellants were the murderers. The prosecution
had at the time of the ruling made out a case upon which it
was entitled to go to the jury and, consequently, the trial
court correctly overruled the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Further, this in no way could prejudice the appellants since
the evidence that was offered in their defense in no way detracted from the validity of the court's ruling. In fact, the
defense evidence could best be categorized as innocuous as
respects its effect upon the case the state had presented.
C. The trial court definitely did not err in giving Instruction No. 9. The appellants argue that the instruction
was prejudicial because it allowed the jury to find the appellants guilty of second degree murder because of their "intending injury without death." In State v. Russell, 106 U.
116, 145 P.2d 1003 ( 1944), this court indicated that the
intention was:
" ( 1 ) An intention or design previously formed to kill
or cause great bodily injury; or (2) an intention or
design previously formed to do an act or omit to do an
act, knowing that the reasonable and natural consequences thereof would be likely to cause death or great
bodily injury;***.''
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'Thus the Russell case adopted the recognized rule that
unpremeditated murder can be satisfied by one of two intentions: first, the intent to kill, or second, the intent to do
great bodily harm. The finding of either intent will be sufficit·nt to "·arrant a conviction. In the instant case, the jury
was instructed:
''3. That 'vhen the defendants, or either of them,
struck the fatal blow he or they had a specific design
or intention, thought out beforehand, to cause great
bodily injury to the deceased, OR an intention or
design thought out beforehand to do an act, knowing the reasonable and natural consequences thereof
would be likely to cause great bodily injury to the
deceased;"
This instruction was directly in line with the alternative
instructions set out in the Russell case. The trial court was
apparently of the opinion that there was no intention to kill
on the part of the appellants but that they intended to inflict great bodily harm. In so instructing the jury, the instruction "·as to the advantage of the appellants since if the
jurors felt that the appellants had intended to kill and not
merely inflict great bodily harm, they might have acquitted.
It is clear that the jury did in fact find an intention on the
part of the appellants, which readily appears from the evidence, to inflict great bodily harm upon the deceased.
InState v. Jensen, 120 U. 531,236 P.2d 445 ( 1951), Justice Crockett stated the intent required for second degree
murder:
"With respect to his intent: It is the established law
of this state that in order to make the crime of second
degree murder the defendant must have intended to
either (a) kill, or (b) do great bodily harm, or (c) do
an act \vhich \\rould naturally and probably cause
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death or great bodily harm to the deceased. State v.
Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153; State v. Trujillo, Utah, 214 P.2d 626."
This decision appears to be the most recent expression of
this court as to the intent required in second degree murder
and clearly the language of the opinion is couched in alternative terms. In State v. Thompson, 110 U. 113, 170
P.2d 153 ( 1946), this court again stated that the element of
murder was in the alternative. It commented:

"* * * Thus there can be no murder, either in the
first or second degree, without a planned, designed or
thought out beforehand intention to kill or cause great
bodily injury, or to do an act knowing that the natural
and probable consequences thereof would be to cause
death or great bodily injury to some other person, or
to commit certain types of felonies. * * *"
In State v. Trujillo, 117 U. 237, 214 P.2d 626 ( 1950),
Justice Pratt stated that the failure of the court to instruct
upon the requirement of intent in charging of murder in
the second degree could be prejudicial by misleading the
jury in thinking that if they found an intent to kill, they
must find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
The court reversed the Trujillo case where the jury in fact
had convicted of murder in the first degree. The opinion
of Justice Pratt, which is the only opinion of the court on
the matter, was concerned with the prejudice of the instruction on the conviction of first degree murder feeling that the
erroneous instruction would compel a conviction of first
degree murder if the jury found an intent to kill. He stated:

"* * * The effect of such a limitation is to impress
the jury with the thought that if the intent to kill was
present, then the offense must be murder in the first
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degree; "·hercas, if the. intent is that of doing great
bodily harm, it is murder in the second degree, depending of course, upon the other elements necessary.***"
Such is not the case in this situation since the jury convicted
the lowest crime which was raised by the evidence. The
absence of an intent to kill in second degree murder and
instruction upon the intent to inflict great bodily harm as
noted above, "·auld not have prejudiced the appellants, but
in fact \\·ould only have helped them. The Trujillo case is
no precedent for claiming error in this case and indeed the
opinion of the majority does not seem to be the law in this
jurisdiction since only Justice Pratt appeared to follow that
vic\r. Justices Wade, Wolfe and McDonough concurred
separately and Justice Latimer dissented.
It \\·auld seem obvious that the primary difference bet\\'een first and second degree murder is that in the latter
case, there is an absence of premeditation and deliberation.
The failure to instruct upon intent to kill could only be
prejudicial in a conviction for first degree murder. It is submitted that it would be as erroneous for a trial judge to instruct in the alternative of an intent to kill or inflict great
bodily hatm \vhere the evidence did not raise the issue of an
intent to kill, as it \\·ould be in any other case to instruct upon
an element which is not raised by the evidence. In any
event, since the appellants were found guilty of murder in
the second degree and murder in the second degree requires
either the intent to kill or the intent to inflict great bodily
harm, the instruction of the trial court could not have been
prejudicial.
D. The appellants contend that the giving of Instruction
Xo. 12 ,,·as improper. The instruction was wholly proper
because the question of intent to kill was raised by the
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court's instructions on first degree murder ( R. 39). The
instruction, therefore, was proper with reference to that
charge. Paragraph 3 of that instruction was directly in
accord with this court's decision in State v. Thompson,
supra, State v. Trujillo, supra, and State v. jensen, supra.
It is a correct evidentiary statement. The appellants' final
contention with reference to Instruction No. 12 that there
is no definition for the jury of the word "assailed" can be
answered by pointing out that it is a term of general recognized meaning and requires no specific definition since it is
intelligible to the layman. Additionally, the appellants requested no definition from the court nor did they except to
the failure of the court to define the term. They are, therefore, procluded from having the matter reviewed on appeal.
E. The appellants' contention that given Instruction
No. 15 was prejudicial as to Ray Gallegos because there
was no evidence of his participation is erroneous. Suffice is
to say there was substantial evidence of Ray Gallegos' participation. Hoopiiana testified that Ray Gallegos took a cut
at Yanes as he fell to the ground. Further, Ray Gallegos
held a knife on Hoopiiana to keep him from interfering.
Appellants' argument that this is "prevention" and not
"participation" is too absurd to warrant answer.
F. Given Instruction No. 16 was excepted to because the
word "defendant" was used. However, Instruction No. 3
was sufficient to advise the jury that where "defendants" is
used, it is referable to one or both of the defendants and no
intelligent person could claim confusion on that matter.
G. Appellants contend that given Instruction No. 18
was erroneous because they allege that the court instructed
the word "wilful" was synonymous with "intentional." A
reading of Instruction No. 18 ( R. 49-51 ) , discloses that
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this is not a correct interpretation of the instruction. The
\Vord ~\"ilfur' \vas defined as follows:
'''The \vords 'wilful, and 'wilfully' when applied to
the intent \vith "·hich an act is done imply simply a
purpose or \villingness to commit the act, and do not
require any intent to violate the law, or to injure
another, or to acquire advantage."
The words "intent" and "specific intent" were defined as
follO\VS:
"The 'vord 'intent' means intention, design, resolve;
a determination of the mind.
"The term 'specific intent' means a fixed direction
of the mind to a particular object, or a determination
to act in a particular manner."
It is obvious, therefore, from a mere reading of the instructions, that the court did not instruct that "wilful" was synonymous \vith "intentional." Further, the exceptions which
the appellants took in the trial court to Instruction No. 18
did not allege such a grounds as a defect. Having failed to
specify such a ground in exception at the trial level, the
appellants may not claim error on review.
H. The appellants contend that it was error for the trial
court to give Instruction No. 20. Instruction No. 20 advised
the jury on t\\'O points: One, that physical retaliation for
the purposes of revenge is not a defense to the commission
of murder; and t\\·o, that evidence of physical retaliation
for defense purposes could be used to establish motive. Both
of these elements in the instruction are correct statements of
the Ia,,·. Indeed, the appellants' argument under Section H
of their brief leaves some question in the mind of the reader
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parently the appellants contend that this instruction was
not warranted by the evidence. This is, of course, without
merit. The evidence disclosed Yanes' participation in the
assault on Ted Gallegos, it also disclosed that the Gallegos
brothers and others were bent upon revenge for all persons
who had participated in the assault. It is a correct statement of law that revenge is not a defense to a crime. See
authorities infra, page 13. It is equally well established that
motive may be considered as evidence in determining guilt
or Innocence.
In summary, it is submitted that the contentions made in
the appellants' brief A through H, are wholly without
merit. For the most part, the claimed errors are not errors
at all and would provide no basis in any common law jurisdiction to allow the appellants to escape punishment for
their crime. Secondly, those claims which may show some
minor impropriety are substantially far removed from any
situation where specific prejudice could be claimed. Section 77--42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:
"After hearing an appeal the court must give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties. If error has
been committed, it shall not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that
it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the
judgment."
In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence of
record which would lead a reasonable man to conclude the
appellants were not afforded a fair trial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
CO~CLUSION

·rhc factual record of this case discloses a senseless, revengeful murder which is intolerable in any civilized society. The criminal conduct which permeates this record is
reprehensible in the extreme. The district attorney who
pros<'cuted the case did an excellent job in presenting to the
jury the motive and background for the murder and clearly
provrd the appellants, guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.
The legal errors which the appellants claim warrant reVt.'rsal either do not exist or are totally without prejudicial
effect.
Jurors are no less conscious of their duty with respect to
determining the guilt and innocence of persons accused of
murder than are judges who oversee the cases. There is no
sho\ving of any substantial error to warrant this court in
granting the appellants' relief. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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